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Based on a trivariate panel VAR and utilizing Generalized Impulse Responses, we 
explored the dynamic impacts of terrorism and crime risks on public order and safety 
spending across European countries during the period 1994-2006. Our findings 
suggest that both a shock in terrorism risk or in crime, significantly increase the 
subsequent trajectory of public order and safety spending. As a by-product we find 
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1. Introduction 
  The extant empirical literature has established that terrorism activity leads to a 
wide range of adverse economic effects (see Brock and Wickstrom 2004; Brock et al., 
2008). In this study we are interested in exploring terrorism's potential effects on 
fiscal expenditure. In principle, one may consider indirect fiscal costs, for instance the 
erosion of tax base via a disruption in economic activity, or direct costs such as the 
increase in the terrorism-related public spending. Moreover, another important 
dimension is the possibility of "crowding out effects", which can be of two forms. 
Either affecting the composition of public spending, whereby an increase in terrorism-
related expenditure reduces the resources dedicated to other public uses, and/or the 
more traditional case where increased terrorism-related spending crowds out private 
spending. The sparse literature on the issue has produced evidence for a limited 
terrorism fiscal impact (Hobijn, 2002; Lenain, et al., 2002; Wildasin, 2002; 
Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2004; Gupta, et al., 2004). It should be noted however, that 
these studies have either relied on overall fiscal expenditure or employed defence 
spending. Thus, it becomes apparent that identifying terrorism's impact using such 
metrics is rather hard. Perhaps a more promising avenue would be to rely on public 
spending that is more likely to be classified as terrorism-related. However, such data 
are difficult to obtain mainly for two reasons: : (i) the fact that state budgets 
incorporate several scattered funds, that are related either to the prevention of 
terrorism (counterterrorism) or coping with the consequences of terrorism, and (ii) the 
fact that anti-terrorism fiscal expenditures are not directly observed, either because 
they are classified or because they are embedded in other more general expenditures.  
In order to circumvent these problems we adopt the pragmatic approach that 
terrorism is a criminal activity. Hence, the natural source for locating anti-terrorism 2 
 
expenditures is the spending on public order and safety. Of course, such spending is 
targeted towards crime as well and therefore, any econometric analysis must take this 
into account. In other words, in order to avoid biases in inference a complete 
econometric model requires the use of public order spending, terrorism activity as 
well as crime activity. Moreover, one cannot simply rely on a single equation context 
where public spending is projected on terrorism and crime since, leaving aside the 
endogeneity issues, it might be difficult to distinguish public spending's responses to 
the two stimuli (terrorism, crime). To tackle these issues we employ a panel vector 
autoregressive (PVAR) approach that overcomes endogeneity issues, while at the 
same time allowing for country-specific unobserved heterogeneity – largely absent 
from time series analyses. Our approach also allows us to isolate the effect of these 
two types of risk on public order and safety spending, as well as the effectiveness of 
spending in reducing these types of risk. The latter is explored by examining a set of 
identification free impulse responses, the so-called Generalized Impulse Responses 
(GIRs) suggested by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) of the variable 
of interest, namely public order and safety spending. 
   Our paper makes a twofold contribution to the  security economics literature: 
(i) we provide empirical evidence for a panel of European countries using public 
order and safety spending data, which clearly are more relevant for the issue at hand, 
and (ii) we employ generalized rather than orthogonalized impulse-response 
functions, that free our results from stringent identification restrictions, usually 
employed in time series analysis. Moreover, by means of our impulse response 
analysis, we are able to separate the response of public order and safety to historical 
shocks to either terrorism or crime risk. 
 3 
 
2.   Data Issues and Background Analysis 
  We use panel data for 29 European Countries to study the dynamic 
relationship between the levels of risk, be it terrorism or crime, a country faces and 
the level of public order and safety spending. The countries under scrutiny are: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK. The time span of our data covers the time period from 
1994 to 2006 , and is dictated by data availability. 
  We obtained our data by combining various sources. Data on public order 
spending were obtained by the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics (GFS), 
which provides measures in terms of domestic currency.
1 These were then converted 
into real US dollars per person measured at 2005 PPP. Original series were deflated 
using the GDP deflator and expressed in per capita terms (both derived from IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics (IFS)). The series were then converted into US 
dollars using 2005 PPP rates, obtained from World Bank's World Development 
Indicators (WDI). Furthermore, in order to proxy for country-level terrorism and 
crime risks, we make use of the annual count of terrorism events and total registered 
crimes, which were obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and from 
Eurostat respectively.      
 Letting  i and t denote country and year respectively we define the following 
variables, which we employ in our analysis:  
                                                 
1 The reported values in GFS measure the variable of interest either in cash or in accrual basis. In our 
work we employ cash measures, when these are available, albeit the two numbers rarely differ. We are 
thankful to Athanasios Tagkalakis for discussions on this issue. 4 
 
  it POSS : the logarithm of public order and safety spending, measured in real 
per capita US dollars at 2005 PPP;   
  it TRISK : the logarithm of one plus the number of per capita terrorist attacks
2; 
  it CRISK : the logarithm of one plus the number of per capita crimes. 
3.   Econometric Methodology 
In our analysis we employ a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) methodology, 
applied to panel data (PVAR). A VAR methodology squares well with our purposes 
here, as there is no a priori theory regarding the causal relations between the variables 
of interest, namely country spending on safety and country security risks. In such a 
framework, all variables are treated as endogenous in a system of equations, while the 
short-run dynamics may be identified at a later stage (Lütkepohl, 2006). In particular 
a VAR model allows us to explore the causal relationships between the variables of 
interest, with causality running in either direction: from risk to spending and from 
spending to risk.
3  
  The PVAR technique combines the traditional VAR approach, which treats all 
the variables in the system as endogenous, with the panel-data approach, which allows 
for unobserved individual heterogeneity. To begin, we specify a panel VAR model 
with k lags as follows: 
  01 1 ... , 1,..., ; 1,..., it it k it k i t it iN tT     y= μ +Ay A y +α +λ +u  (1) 
where ( , , )' it it it it POSS TRISK CRISK  y  is a three-variable random vector, composed 
of a measure of public ordered and safety spending, a measure of terrorism activity 
risk and a measure of crime activity risk;  j A  are a 33 matrices of estimable 
                                                 
2 Both risks are expressed in per capita terms in order to account for the country size. 
3 This causality is not restricted by any means to be Granger-Causality. 5 
 
coefficients;  i α  denotes unobserved country-affects;  t λ  denotes time-effects; and 
it u is a 31 vector of well behaved disturbances.  
As is common in panel data studies, we need to impose the restriction that the 
underlying structure is the same for each cross-sectional unit, i.e. the coefficients in 
the matrices  j A  are the same for all countries in our sample. Since this assumption is 
likely to be violated, our model allows for “individual heterogeneity” in the levels of 
the variables by introducing fixed effects, denoted by  i α  in the model. Then our 
model (1) is a system of dynamic panel data equations. It is known, however, that the 
fixed effects are correlated with the regressors due to lags of the dependent variables 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998), so 
the usual within transformation to eliminate fixed effects would create biased 
coefficients.
4 Hence, we employ forward orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover, 
1995) to eliminate the fixed effects. This procedure removes only the forward mean, 
i.e. the mean of all the future observations available for each country-year. This 
transformation preserves the orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged 
regressors, so we can use lagged regressors as instruments and estimate the 
coefficients by system GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995).
5 
The reduced form VAR is useful, in that it allows implementing dynamic 
simulations, once the unknown parameters are estimated. This usually involves 
impulse response (IR) analysis and variance decompositions (VD) that allow one to 
examine the impact of innovations to any particular variable to other variables in the 
                                                 
4 Individual heterogeneities have been a major issue in dynamic panel models, as they render the 
standard fixed and random effects estimators inconsistent (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and 
Bover, 1995). 
5 See also Love and Zicchino (2006) and Arias and Escudero (2007) for different applications of the 
PVAR techniques employed in this paper. 6 
 
system. Such exercises require solving a delicate identification issue.
6 The most 
common way to deal with this problem is to choose a causal ordering so that more 
exogenous variables impact on the more endogenous ones in a sequential order.
7  
As we are unwilling to defend any particular causal ordering, we opt for the 
use of Generalized Impulse Responses (GIR) and variance decompositions (GVD) 
suggested by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), which aim avoiding 
particular orthogonalizations of the shocks. In particular, a GIR measures the effect of 
a typical (historical) shock in variable  , li t y  on the system of equations. One way to 
interpret these is as the effect a change  , li y  by  l  at time t has on the expected values 
of the whole stochastic vector  it y  at time t+h. In addition, Pesaran and Shin (1998) 
show that GIRs in linear systems will be invariant to history (the information set on 
which we condition) and will depend only on the composition of the shocks, i.e. the 
vector ζ  we choose. 
4.   Empirical Results 
  Before proceeding with estimating the panel VAR, we need to make a choice 
regarding the number of lags to use in the system of equations (Lütkepohl, 2006). To 
do so, we employ the Arellano-Bover GMM estimator for lags between one and four, 
and employ standard information criteria (e.g. Akaike and Schwarz) to select the 
appropriate lag-length. Both the AIC and SIC indicate that two lags should be used 
(see Table A.1 in the Appendix). However, the estimated parameters for the second 
lag were not statistically significant, and we finally opted for a PVAR of order one, 
                                                 
6 A more detailed discussion of the identification issues is discussed in the Appendix. 
7 This assumption is implicit in the Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the error 
terms, which imposes a recursive orthogonal structure (causal ordering) on the identified shocks.  7 
 
which preserves the information in the low frequency data we use, while also 
economizes on the degrees of freedom.
8 
  Furthermore, in order to be able to analyze the impulse-response functions we 
need an estimate of their confidence intervals. As the estimated impulse response 
functions is based on the estimated VAR coefficient, sampling uncertainty needs to be 
taken into account. We obtain standard errors for the impulse response functions by 
means of Monte Carlo simulations. In particular, we randomly generate random draws 
of the VAR coefficients, using the estimated coefficients and the estimated covariance 
matrix of the errors, to recalculate the impulse responses (see Love and Zicchino, 
2006; Arias and Escudero, 2007).
9 
  The estimated parameters of the panel VAR(1) specification are reported in 
Table 1. Our results show that public order and safety spending responds positively to 
its lagged value, and positively to lagged terrorism and crime risk, albeit the 
coefficient on terrorism risk is insignificant. On the other hand, terrorism risk is 
influenced positively by past terrorism risk and past crime risk, but also – somewhat 
surprisingly – positively by lagged POSS. However, the coefficient estimates are 
insignificant. Finally, we see the crime risk is responds positively and significantly to 
past crime risk, and positively insignificantly to past terrorism risk. We find again that 
crime risk is influenced positively by lagged POSS, however the coefficient estimate 
is insignificant. 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
One might question the meaningfulness of these findings. Our point of view is 
that the results in Table 1, being estimates from a reduced form model do not convey 
                                                 
8 Results are available upon request. 
9 In practice we repeat this procedure 1000 (experimenting with more replications delivers similar 
insights). We generate the 16
th and 84
th (68%) percentiles of this distribution is generated and we use 
this as a confidence interval for the impulse responses. 8 
 
much information. Instead, one should pay attention to the underlying moving 
average (MA) representation of the VAR model, namely the impulse response 
functions (IRs) and the associated variance decompositions (VDs). These two 
combined, convey information on how each variable responds to a surprise change (a 
shock) to another variable in the system.  
As we agued above, IRFs and VDs may be obtained for various identification 
schemes, based on different orderings of the variables. However, such identifying 
assumptions are hard to stomach, as they require strong exogeneity assumptions that 
are probably violated in our data. Hence, we opt for the use of generalized impulse 
response functions (GIRs) and variance decompositions (GVDs) that do not depend 
on the particular ordering of the variables in the system. 
The GIRs from are plotted in Figure 1, and are normalized to correspond to a 
one percent increase of POSS (first column), TRISK (second column) and CRISK 
(third column) respectively. We first note that a 1% increase in POSS persists over 
time, as it takes roughly five years to return to its previous level. It is also clear, that 
such a policy change does not have any significant impact on crime risk. We also find 
that an increase of POSS, leads to an increase of terrorism risk on impact, but this 
effect becomes insignificant after one year. These findings taken at face value, imply 
that public order spending is at best ineffective in reducing terrorism or crime risk. 
Similar evidence for terrorism has been reported by Kollias et al. (2009) who study 
the effectiveness of public spending on terrorism activity.    
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
Next, we turn our attention to the IRF's of main interest, i.e. those that trace 
out the dynamic impacts of risks on public spending. We find that an increase in 
terrorism risk by one percentage point dies out pretty quickly, while exerting a 9 
 
negative effect on crime risk – although this effect is insignificant as can be seen from 
the wide confidence intervals. Importantly though, we find that such a shock leads to 
an increase of POSS by roughly 0.05 percent on impact. The peak response of POSS 
is after one year, and then it converges to its pre-shock level smoothly. In other words, 
public spending is responsive to observed terrorism risk. Turning now to crime risk 
we see that it has pronounced effects. In particular, we find that even six years after 
the shock, it does not return to its pre-shock level. More importantly though we see 
that it has a strong and long-lasting positive effect on both POSS and TRISK.
10 In 
particular, we find that POSS increases on impact by 0.08 percent, and its response 
peaks after four years (having increased by 0.6 percent). Similarly, we find that 
TRISK increases on impact (by 0.16 percent) and its response reaches its peak after 
two years (0.69 percent).  
In Table 2, we report the GVDs for POSS, TRISK and CRISK, which provide 
evidence of the importance of terrorism risk and crime risk for public order and safety 
spending, as well as of the importance of POSS for TRISK and CRISK. These results 
are in line with the GIRs analysis above. In particular, at a horizon of five years, about 
4% of the POSS forecast error variance is attributed to terrorism risk, while about 
13% is due to crime risk. At longer horizons (10, 20 and 30 years) TRISK becomes 
less important, whereas the importance of CRISK increase over time (accounting for 
25%, 32% and 33% respectively). Turning to TRISK, we see that about 3% of its 
forecast error variance is accounted for by variations in POSS, for all horizons, while 
variations in CRISK are becoming more important over time accounting for 3% at a 
five year horizon, 5% at ten years, and about 7% at a thirty year horizon. 
                                                 
10 The largest eigenvalue of the companion matrix  1 A  which determines the stability properties of the 
VAR is 0.919, hence the VAR is stable. On the other hand, the fact that this eigenvalue is large enough, 
explains why the impulse responses to CRISK – the most persistent variable in our analysis – have 
long-lasting but by no means permanent effects on the other two variables in the system. 10 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
4.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
A natural question that arises is how robust are the results we have reported 
thus far to the number of lags employed in the PVAR. A second question pertains to 
whether our results are robust to the measure of POSS employed.
11 We assess these 
issues in turns. 
First, we assess the robustness of our results to varying the number of lags in 
the analysis. To this end, we have re-estimated PVAR models with two, three and 
four lags. Estimating a model with two lags, delivers similar - if not identical – 
insights both in terms of impulse responses and variance decompositions. Increasing 
the number of lags to three or four, however we now find both terrorism and crime 
risk have a more pronounced and significant effects on public safety spending. In 
particular, we find that an increase in either type of risk induces and increase of POSS 
on impact, the response being significant for roughly five years. Furthermore, in these 
cases we find that the fraction of variance share of POSS explained by innovations to 
CRISK is roughly equal that reported in our results. What becomes much more 
pronounced is the extent of variability of POSS explained by innovations in TRISK, 
which at horizons of thirty years after the shock, explains a good 40% of the POSS 
variation. 
Secondly, in order to assess the sensitivity of our results to the particular 
measure of POSS we have employed, as an alternative we have opted for the ratio of 
POSS relative to GDP, as the relevant variable. As in our main results, standard 
information criteria suggest that a PVAR(2) is appropriate, but the coefficients on the 
second lag are statistically insignificant; hence we have opted for a model with one 
                                                 
11 Recall that POSS is measured in real US dollars per capita using 2005 PPPs. 11 
 
lag. Based on this, the results we obtained are in line with those we discussed above. 
We have also experimented with varying the lag length, which again provided us with 
results, that are similar to those obtained using our benchmark measure of POSS. 
5.   Conclusions 
Based on a trivariate panel VAR and in particular the Generalized Impulse 
Responses, we explored the dynamic impacts of terrorism and crime risks on public 
order and safety spending across European countries during the period 1994-2006. 
Our findings suggest that a shock in terrorism risk leads to an increase of public order 
and safety spending by roughly 0.05 percent on impact, with the response peaking 
after one year. In addition, a shock in crime risk also leads to an increase in public 
spending, by 0.08 percent on impact, and the response peaking after four years. These 
findings are also confirmed by the Generalised Variance Decompostions, which 
suggest that terrorism risk and crime risk tend to increase public order and safety 
spending.  
We see two natural extensions of the present study. First, one could enlarge 
the sample by considering non-European countries as well. Second, it would be 
fruitful to investigate the potential interplay between public spending and observed 
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Table 1: Panel VAR Estimates 
 Equation 
Dependent Variable  it POSS   it TRISK   it CRISK  
1 it POSS    0.586*** 0.097  0.003 
[t-stat]  [4.953] [0.354] [0.053] 
1 it TRISK    0.020 0.156 -0.015 
[t-stat]  [0.429] [1.238] [-0.835] 
1 it CRISK    0.313* 0.600  0.930*** 
[t-stat]  [1.924] [0.989] [10.081] 
Nobs. 281  281  281 
ˆ 100 u     2.636 28.823 0.553 
      
Notes for Table 1:  it POSS  stands for the logarithm of public order and safety spending, measured in 
real per capita US dollars (2005 PPP);  it TRISK  denotes the logarithm of one plus the number of terrorist 
attacks per person;  it CRISK  denotes the logarithm of one plus the number of crimes per person. The 
PVAR model is estimated using system GMM. Reported numbers show the coefficients of regressing 
the dependent variables on lags of the independent variables.  The two largest eigenvalues of the 
companion matrix, which determine the stability of the PVAR, are 0.919 and 0.591. Heteroskedasticity 




Notes for Table 2: The table reports the fraction (in percentage points) of the h-years ahead forecast 
error variance of each variable, that is attributable to generalized innovations in  it POSS ,  it TRISK  and 





Table 2: Variance Decompositions 
E( ) it t it POSS POSS    E( ) it t it TRISK TRISK    E( ) it t it CRISK CRISK   
Generalized Innovations to 
h  it POSS   it TRISK   it CRISK it POSS it TRISK it CRISK it POSS it TRISK   it CRISK  
1  100.00 2.83  0.12  2.83 100.00 0.05  0.12  0.05 100.00 
2  98.18 4.10  2.06 3.07  99.24 0.79 0.09 0.40 99.41 
3  95.13 4.24  5.38 3.12  98.33 1.66 0.08 0.62 99.09 
4  91.44 4.08  9.26 3.12  97.50 2.47 0.07 0.75 98.91 
5  87.72 3.88 13.07 3.11  96.79 3.17 0.07 0.82 98.81 
10  75.19 3.37 25.46 3.04  94.53 5.42 0.06 0.96 98.61 
20  68.32 3.17 32.12 3.00  93.15 6.79 0.06 1.01 98.54 






























































Figure 1. Generalized Impulse Responses of  , it it POSS TRISK  and  it CRISK . 
 
Notes for Figure 1: The figure displays the generalized impulse responses of the column variable 
( ,, it it it POSS TRISK CRISK ) to a one percent shock the row variable ( ,, it it it POSS TRISK CRISK ). 
it POSS  The dashed lines show the one standard deviation standard errors generated by Monte Carlo 






















A.1 Generalized Impulse Responses 
The effects of shocks in the variables are easily seen from the Wold moving 
average (MA) representation of  it y : 
  1, 1 2, 2 3, 3 +... i t i t it it it     yuC u C u C u  (A.1) 
The coefficient matrices of this representation may be obtained by recursive formulas 
from the coefficient matrix  j A (see Lütkepohl, 2006; or Hamilton, 1994). The 
elements of the  s C ’s may be interpreted as the responses to impulses hitting the 
system. In particular, the kl-th element of  s C  represents the expected marginal 
response of  , ki t y  to a unit change in  , li t y  holding constant all past values of the 
process. 
Since the components of  it u  may be instantaneously correlated, orthogonal 
innovations are often preferred in impulse response analysis. Using a Cholesky 
decomposition of the covariance matrix E( ') it it  u uu Σ  is one way to obtain 
uncorrelated innovations. Let B be a lower-triangular matrix with the property that 
'. BB Σu  . Then orthogonalized shocks are given by 
1
it it
  ε Bu. Substituting in 
(A.1) and defining  s s  DC B  (s = 0,1,2, ...) gives 
  01 1 2 2 ... it it it it     yD ε D ε D ε  (A.2) 
Notice that  0 D= B  is lower triangular so that the first shock may have an 
instantaneous effect on all the variables, whereas the second shock can only have an 
instantaneous effect on  2,it y  to  , ni t y  but not on  1,it y . This way a recursive Wold causal 
chain is obtained. The effects of the shocks  it ε  are sometimes called orthogonalized 
impulse responses because they are instantaneously uncorrelated (orthogonal). 
  A well-known drawback is that many matrices Β exist which satisfy 
u Σ BB' – the Choleski decomposition is to some extent arbitrary if there are no good 
reasons for a particular recursive structure. Clearly, if a lower triangular Choleski 
decomposition is used to obtain Β, the actual innovations will depend on the ordering 
of the variables in the vector  it y  so that different shocks and responses may result if 
the vector  it y  is rearranged. 
As we mentioned, the results of analyses based on orthogonalization 
assumptions depend on the ordering of the variables to obtain Β and hence the 
orthogonalized shocks. Recent results by Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin 
(1998) though have re-examined the concept of orthogonalized impulse responses, 
aiming to remove this shortcoming. Instead of orthogonalized impulse responses from 
a Choleski decomposition, they suggested generalized impulse responses (GIR 
henceforth) that are based on a “typical” shock to the system.  
  The argument about GIR may be explained as follows. Let the Vector Moving 
Average (VMA) representation of the n-variable PVAR model be given by 
  0, 0 it i t s s t j s

    y κκκ Cu  (A.3) 17 
 
where  o κ  is a vector of constants,  i κ  are country-effects,  t κ  are time effects, and  it u  
is a vector of unobserved “shocks”, where    ~ it n u u IIDN 0,Σ  and let  lm   be a typical 
element of  u Σ . Then it holds that 
   
1
, E it i lt l u l ll l u  
  u Σ e  (A.4) 
where  l e  is a  1  n  selection vector with element l equal to unity and zeroes 
elsewhere. Then the GIR of the effect of a “unit” shock to the l-th disturbance term at 
time t on  , it h  y  is 
  














 and the GIRs are measured h periods after the shock has occurred.
12 
In general, Pesaran and Shin (1998) show that one can interpret generalized 
impulse responses for a stationary vector process  it y  as 
       , 1, 1 , 1 ,E ,E .
it h t i th i t t i th t GIR
         y ζ yuζ y  
They also explain that in a linear system, the impulse responses will be invariant to 
history (the information set on which conditioning is made), and so the GIR will 
depend only on the composition of the shocks as defined by ζ . In addition, they 
demonstrate that the GIR will be numerically equivalent to the standard impulse 
response function based on Cholesky decompositions, only if  u Σ  is diagonal. 
  Furthermore, the share of variance of  , ki t y  explained by a shock in variable 























Note that due to the non-zero covariance between the original (non-orthogonalized) 
shocks, in general, the variance shares may not sum to unity. 
 
A.2 Data Background and Summary Statistics 
Data Sources 
IMF’s Government Financial Statistics: http://www2.imfstatistics.org/GFS/  
IMF’s International Financial Statistics: http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/  
World Bank’s World Development Indicators: http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators  
Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/ 
Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ 
 
                                                 
12  By letting 




it h hu l l l GIR h l 

  y C Σ e  which measures the effect of one standard error shock to the l-th 
equation at time t on expected values of  i y  at time t+h. 18 
 
A.3 Lag-Length Selection for PVARs 
 
Table A.1: Information Criteria 
lags AIC  SIC 
1 -10.043  -9.746 
2  -10.574 -9.918
3 -10.472  -9.374 
4 -10.262  -8.599 
Notes for Table A.1: The table reports the Akaike and Scwarz information criteria, employed in 








































Not for Publication Appendix: Further Results 
 
Table A.I: Panel VAR(2) Estimates 
 Equation 
Dependent Variable  it POSS   it TRISK   it CRISK  
1 it POSS    0.643*** -0.055  0.008 
[t-stat]  [4.273] [-0.168] [0.105] 
1 it TRISK    0.017 0.201 -0.001 
[t-stat]  [0.301] [1.398] [-0.065] 
1 it CRISK    0.118 0.332  0.985*** 
[t-stat]  [0.810] [0.430] [7.379] 
2 it POSS    -0.018 0.150 -0.019 
[t-stat]  [-0.239] [0.828] [-0.706] 
2 it TRISK    -0.017 -0.060  0.000 
[t-stat]  [-0.339] [-0.625] [-0.028] 
2 it CRISK    0.110 -0.053 -0.046 
[t-stat]  [1.261] [-0.119] [-0.707] 
Nobs. 248  248  248 
ˆ 100 u     1.833 23.254 0.525 
      
      
Notes for Table: The two largest eignevalues of the companion matrix are 0.924 and 0.635. See also 
notes for Table 1. 
 
 
Table A.II: Panel VAR Estimates 
 Equation 
Dependent Variable  it POSS   it TRISK   it CRISK  
1 it POSS    0.603*** 19.244  1.122 
[t-stat]  [7.151] [1.022] [0.405] 
1 it TRISK    0.000 0.156 -0.015 
[t-stat]  [0.610] [1.277] [-0.830] 
1 it CRISK    0.003* 0.583  0.927*** 
[t-stat]  [1.653] [1.080] [13.243] 
Nobs. 281  281  281 
ˆ 100 u     2.636 28.823 0.553 
      
Notes for Table 1:  it POSS  stands for the ratio of public order and safety spending relative to GDP; 
it TRISK  denotes the logarithm of one plus the number of terrorist attacks per person;  it CRISK  denotes 
the logarithm of one plus the number of crimes per person. The PVAR model is estimated using system 
GMM. Reported numbers show the coefficients of regressing the dependent variables on lags of the 
independent variables.  The two largest eigenvalues of the companion matrix, which determine the 
stability of the PVAR, are 0.924 and 0.612. Heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics are in square 









Notes for Table A.III: The table reports the fraction (in percentage points) of the h-years ahead 
forecast error variance of each variable, that is attributable to generalized innovations in  it POSS , 





























































Figure A.1. Generalized Impulse Responses of  , it it POSS TRISK  and  it CRISK  from a 
VAR(2). 
 
Notes for Figure A.1: See notes for Figure 1. 
 
Table A.III: Variance Decompositions 
E( ) it t it POSS POSS    E( ) it t it TRISK TRISK    E( ) it t it CRISK CRISK   
Generalized Innovations to 
h  it POSS   it TRISK   it CRISK   it POSS it TRISK   it CRISK it POSS it TRISK   it CRISK  
1  100.00 1.22 0.00 1.22 100.00 0.02  0.04  0.09 100.00 
2  98.56 2.71  0.00  1.98 98.85 0.28  0.02  0.34 99.99 
3  96.62 3.09  0.37  2.31 97.68 0.44  0.02  0.49 99.98 
4  94.30 3.11  1.14  2.43 96.69 0.56  0.03  0.57 99.98 
5  91.86 3.03  2.17  2.47 95.84 0.70  0.03  0.61 99.98 
10  82.61 2.72  7.61  2.45 93.07 1.38  0.05  0.68 99.97 
20  76.69 2.57  12.07  2.40 91.26 1.92  0.07  0.71 99.97 











































































































































































Figure A.4. Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of  , it it POSS TRISK  
and  it CRISK from a PVAR(1).  
Notes for Figure A.4: Each row shows the share (percent) of forecast error variance explained by a 
shock in column variable. For instance, the first column shows the forecast error variance explained by 











































Figure A.5. Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of  , it it POSS TRISK  
and  it CRISK from a PVAR(2).  











































Figure A.6. Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of  , it it POSS TRISK  
and  it CRISK from a PVAR(3).  









































Figure A.7. Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of  , it it POSS TRISK  
and  it CRISK from a PVAR(4).  





























































Figure A.8. Generalized Impulse Responses of  , it it POSS TRISK  and  it CRISK  from a 
PVAR(1). 




























































Figure A.9. Generalized Impulse Responses of  , it it POSS TRISK  and  it CRISK  from a 
PVAR(2). 




























































Figure A.10. Generalized Impulse Responses of  , it it POSS TRISK  and  it CRISK  from a 
PVAR(3). 




























































Figure A.11. Generalized Impulse Responses of  , it it POSS TRISK  and  it CRISK  from a 
PVAR(4). 












































Figure A.12. Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of  , it it POSS TRISK  
and  it CRISK from a PVAR(1).  
















































Figure A.13. Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of  , it it POSS TRISK  
and  it CRISK from a PVAR(2).  














































Figure A.14. Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of  , it it POSS TRISK  
and  it CRISK from a PVAR(3).  












































Figure A.15. Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of  , it it POSS TRISK  
and  it CRISK from a PVAR(4).  
Notes for Figure A.15:  it POSS  denotes the ratio of POSS spending to GDP. See also notes for Figure 
A.12. 